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INTRODUCTION
There will have to be a public planning authority.
This, in turn, will have to be under the closest 
legislative supervision. For here will be encoun­
tered the most difficult of all the problems of the 
public cognizance. That will be to have planning 
that reflects not the planning but the public pur­
pose. The creation of the planning machinery, 
which the present structure of the economy makes 
imperative, is the next major task in economic 
design.
------- John Kenneth Galbraith!
The creation of a public planning authority should 
not be considered solely a matter of economic design. It 
should also be a matter of political design if such an 
authority is to comform to values and operational standards 
of a political nature. This paper attempts to consider 
certain political aspects of the design of a public 
planning authority, and it belongs generally to the liter­
ature exploring how planning can be conducted in a demo­
cratic manner. The paper considers, however, only the 
limited topic of the design of political procedures and 
organizational structures for democratic planning.
At various points in the analysis it is acknow­
ledged that the political procedures for planning are 
intertwined with certain social and economic conditions. 
However, these substantive conditions necessary for
1
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democratic planning will not be thoroughly examined here.
In many ways these questions are critical to the 
prospects for democratic planning, but they are simply 
too large and complex to be explored adequately in this 
paper. These matters are handled largely by assumption, 
but not on the basis that the assumptions made are better 
than alternative formulations. Instead, the assumptions , 
are made simply to set aside the debate about these 
issues to allow the limited analysis of this paper to 
be made.
In general, it is assumed that the social and 
economic conditions appropriate to democratic planning 
can be achieved through procedures of a democratic 
nature— that a democratic politics can be a means to a 
democratic society. Moreover, it is assumed that indi­
viduals in society have or can develop, through appro­
priate social arrangements, the capacity for reason and 
the cooperative social orientation necessary to understand, 
identify, and agree through democratic procedures on the 
issues of public policy that are involved in planning. 
Serious objections can be raised to these assumptions by 
those persons who take a more pessimistic view of human 
nature or by those who are pessimistic about the prospects 
for the reform of society through democratic means. A 
larger study of the prospects for democratic planning 
would enter the debate over these assumptions and the
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complex issues underlying them. At best, this paper 
can only be a prelude to such a larger study.
Why is the design of political procedures and 
organizations for democratic planning an appropriate 
topic for a public administration study? The design of 
procedures for a democratic planning authority would 
appear to involve questions somewhat different from the 
literature that focuses on how public agencies can be 
efficient and effective and how conflicting needs of 
employees and organizations can be handled. These latter 
topics are important, but they do not distinguish public 
administration from other management disciplines. What 
can distinguish public administration from these other 
disciplines is a focus on the relationship between the 
public and administrative structures and processes. Such 
a focus involves questions of the accountability and 
responsiveness of administrative processes to public 
preferences and needs and of the values that are served 
or reinforced by administration. These questions high­
light the link between public administration, political 
science, and philosophy. These are also the types of 
questions involved in developing a proposal for a demo­
cratic planning authority. Developing such a proposal is 
a task for public administration as a branch of the study 
of politics.
A major objective of this paper is to suggest
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4
changes in the national governmental process appropriate 
to democratic planning. Approaching this topic requires 
a discussion of the nature of both planning and democracy. 
The discussion of planning becomes an important subtopic 
for the paper, and the view of planning that is presented 
differs substantially from that held by many professional 
planners. Characteristic of the latter view is the 
definition, offered by Andreas Faludi, of planning as 
“the application of scientific method— however crude— to 
policy-making.“2 In contrast to the technical or scien­
tific view of planning, this paper develops a view of 
planning as a form of politics.
The view of planning as a political activity was 
originally prompted by personal experiences in South 
Dakota as a planner and a political party official.3 
Although this view emerged from a variety of experiences, 
it became especially evident through observing the 
similarities between the development of a party legisla­
tive program in 1969 and the preparation of a state 
comprehensive plan in the mid-seventies. In the scope 
of their content, both the program and the plan addressed 
what were assumed by the persons involved in each effort 
to be a reasonably complete agenda of important public 
issues in South Dakota. In terms of their policy purpose, 
each attempted to offer a coherent and intemally- 
consistent perspective on the various issues addressed.
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Both were affected by electoral purposes. The legislative 
program was consciously designed to aid in the election 
of a Democratic administration, and the plan was influ­
enced by the desire to maintain that administration in 
office. Different kinds of knowledge— value judgments, 
insights from experience, and expert analyses— were 
applied in both efforts by the citizens, experts, and 
public officials who directly participated in them.
These observations do not support the idea of planning 
as solely the application of scientific methods to public 
policy.
The idea and implications of planning as a form 
of politics are developed in the first two chapters of 
this paper. The first chapter begins with a definition 
of planning as the deliberate coordination of interrelated 
activities and explores the circumstances that create a 
need for planning. These circumstances involve related 
sets of problems or decisions in which satisfactory 
results are not achieved through a process of voluntary 
exchange or separate government interventions intended 
to respond to cases of market failure. Such problems 
are a symptom of an interdependent world in which 
cumulative and interrelated effects of public and private 
activities are ignored or not fully taken account of by 
existing institutions.
From an analysis of the nature of the circumstances
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that require planning, general characteristics of planning 
are identified. In particular, it is argued that to 
coordinate or plan interrelated activities requires 
general policies that state desired results and outline 
strategies for accomplishing those results. To be 
effective the general policies must be applied on an 
interactive basis to the decisions that are made concern­
ing the specific matters being planned. Those two elements, 
general policies and their interactive application to 
decisions in specific areas, are the major features of 
what is considered in this paper to be general planning. 
Importantly, the development and application of general 
policies involves different kinds of decisions and infor­
mation, Among these decisions are those concerning 
the values to be advanced or realized by the planning 
effort. The general implications of this and other 
characteristics of planning for democratic control are 
also explored.
A major idea developed in the first chapter is 
that the need for general planning is as much a conse­
quence of the selective and piecemeal character of public 
intervention into the private sector as it is a conse­
quence of the absence of a public response to instances 
of market failure. The piecemeal interventions by the 
state in society are termed "partial planning" because 
they attempt to coordinate activities in a limited
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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policy sphere and fail to account for major relation­
ships with activities in other policy spheres. The 
pattern of partial planning at the national level in 
the United States is described in the second chapter 
and related to the fragmented character of the political 
process in this country. Policy-making is parceled out, 
in the normal course of events, among separate networks 
of alliances between interest groups and public officials. 
How this pattern of politics is reflected in planning is 
examined both through a general survey of national 
planning practice and the consideration of major cases 
of planning legislation. The pattern of partial planning, 
it is argued, tends to produce certain systematic failures 
of public policy and to reinforce the control of policy 
in separate areas by groups of minorities.
The second chapter also suggests what some of 
the requirements would be for establishing a general 
planning process at the national level. These require­
ments are developed on the basis of a review of state and 
local, areawide efforts to implement general planning.
The analysis of state and areawide efforts underscores 
the need for both elements of general planning— the 
development of general policies and their application 
on an Interactive basis to specific areas of decisions—  
to be present if the planning effort is to be effective. 
How a general planning process can be made manageable
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and not become bogged down in an effort to plan every­
thing in detail is also analyzed using an example from 
state planning. The manageability of a general planning 
effort is shown to rest on the ability of those doing 
the planning to focus the effort through judgments about 
the values to be emphasized in the planning and the key 
relationships among activities that bear on the realiza­
tion of those values. These are judgments that cut across 
the concerns that may be dominant in any particular policy 
area. Making and applying these judgments requires a 
general planning authority with sufficient power to 
counteract the power of the alliances that generally 
control policy in specific areas.
How the power necessary for general planning to 
be effective can be mobilized and exercised in a demo­
cratic manner is the major concern of this paper. 
Addressing this concern requires the application of a 
perspective concerning the nature of democracy. This 
paper presents one view of democracy based on a model 
developed by Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall. This 
model gives attention to procedural and institutional 
elements of democracy, but also acknowledges the need 
for social conditions that encourage citizen participation 
in the formation of public policy. The procedural and 
institutional elements of democracy are of major concern 
here because of the topic of this paper. However, at
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various points the importance of the knowledge, under- 
sT;anding, and participation of citizens for both effective 
and democratic planning is emphasized in the analysis.
The suggestions for further study concern questions of 
the social conditions necessary for effective citizen 
participation in planning. In terms of establishing a 
framework for this further study, it is important to use 
a model of democracy that acknowledges substantive as 
well as procedural elements of democracy.
The major elements of the Ranney and Kendall 
model of concern for the immediate analysis include:
1. the emphasis on majority rule;
2. the need for a representative assembly to 
establish public policy when the citizens cannot 
do it directly; and
3. the need for effective mechanisms of popular 
consultation that allow for citizen participation 
in proposing, discussing, and evaluating public 
policy.
These major elements are combined with the previously 
determined requirements for a general planning process 
to suggest a general strategy or approach for democratic 
planning. In this approach, the power to be mobilized 
for applying general policies to specific areas would be 
the power of majorities acting through the political 
process. Congress would be charged with the responsibility 
to develop general policies and to maintain a process of 
applying those policies to specific legislative and 
executive decisions. The political parties would be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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developed as the major vehicles for citizen participa­
tion in the general planning process, and the role of 
parties would be adjusted to strengthen their ties to 
the formation of public policy. It is proposed that 
through the parties citizens could directly participate 
in the consideration of policies that would cut across 
the boundaries of particular spheres of policy currently 
dominated by interest groups.
The various elements of this approach to general 
planning are outlined and linked together in the fourth 
chapter. In addition, examples of ways this approach 
could be implemented are presented. These examples are 
not intended to be detailed proposals, but instead are 
suggestions for further consideration.
The principal argument of this paper can be 
summarized as a case that planning, to be both effective 
and consistent with democratic procedures, should be 
organized as a political-legislative process instead 
of as a technical-administrative process. The view that 
planning is a technical-administrative process is clearly 
dominant in American governmental practice, and making 
a case for a different approach requires the analysis of 
the paper to focus on basic, general questions that cover 
broad sets of issues. These questions involve such 
matters as the nature of planning, the pattern of 
American politics, and the nature of democracy. When
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details and particular cases are cited, they are used 
to illustrate or support general points. In the process 
of considering general questions, many detailed issues are 
set aside and left for further consideration. Thus, for 
this reason alone, the paper should be viewed more as 
an effort to initiate than conclMe debate on the topic 
it considers.
The paper can also be considered only a partial 
initiative, because by the nature of the assumptions 
already presented the questions of the social conditions 
necessary for democratic planning have also been set 
aside for this analysis. The nature of some of these 
questions is addressed at the conclusion of the paper in 
the suggestions for further study. The importance of 
these questions that have been set aside should not be 
underestimated, but nor should the questions that are 
addressed here.
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FOOTNOTES
1. John Kenneth Galbraith, Economics and the Public
Purpose (Boston* Houghton Mifflin, 1973)> P* 319.
2. Andreas Paludl, "What Is Planning Theory?" In A
Reader In Planning Theory, ed. Andreas Paludl 
(Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1973)» p. 1.
3. These observations were made while this writer
served as Executive Director of the South Dakota 
Democratic Party, 19&9-71, and as Commissioner 
of the South Dakota State Planning Bureau, 1973-77 
I was responsible for the administration of both 
of the projects discussed here.
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CHAPTER I 
PLANNING
Planning is the deliberate coordination of 
Interrelated activities. Public planning, the focus 
of this paper, involves the coordination of activities 
that are undertaken or influenced by the state. Planning 
arises because there are circumstances that produce 
unsatisfactory results when activities are not delib­
erately coordinated, i.e. left to a process of voluntary 
action or exchange. As Sir Henry Bunbury stated,
. . . when once the belief is abandoned that if 
every individual and particular interest is free 
to pursue its own interests, the advantage of all 
will be most fully realised, planning in some form 
or another becomes essential.1
Planning occurs, according to Mannheim, *'. . . when man 
auid society advance from the deliberate invention of 
single objects to the deliberate regulation and intelli­
gent mastery of the relationships between these objects."2 
Planning is not simply an intellectual or analytical 
activity that produces plans. It is a conscious effort 
to adjust or control activities in their relationship 
to each other.
It is not difficult to identify the results of
13
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the failure to coordinate interrelated activities 
effectively. The simultaneous occurrence of inflation 
and unemployment, the prospective depletion of finite 
energy resources, environmental decay, lagging national 
productivity, rising health care costs with little 
improvement in health, and the specter of an end to 
economic growth producing distributional conflicts 
between rich and poor are the types of problems which 
give rise to predictions or proposals for more extensive 
planning. Underlying these problems is a network of 
interrelationships among organizations, technological 
processes, and the human and natural environments,
In both these problems and the interrelationships 
underlying them, the invisible hand reconciling private 
interest and public purpose is only too visibly absent— and 
absent in a double sense. First, no automatic mechanism 
exists or is likely to exist to manage satisfactorily 
most of the relationships behind the problems. Secondly, 
many of the activities that are interrelated are planned 
to a partial degree either by corporate or other private 
organizations or by that network of bureau-legislative 
committee-interest group structures that Norton Long 
has aptly described as "an almost feudal alignment."3 
The problems arising from incomplete coordination 
in a highly interdependent world raise the prospect 
of planning on a more extensive scale.
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More extensive public planning, to the degree that 
the matters subject to such planning are existing public 
policies and programs, does not necessarily mean more 
extensive state restriction of individual freedom of 
choice. This point follows from the view that general 
planning may be aimed as much at solving problems that 
result from the partial character of existing planning 
as it is at solving problems that result from insufficient 
intervention by the state in society.
The notion of partial planning (to be elaborated 
in the next chapter on planning in the United States ) 
means simply that decisions are made and implemented in 
certain policy areas, e.g. the abatement of pollution, 
with insufficient consideration of their impact on other 
areas of policy, e.g. the control of Inflation. The state 
has typically intervened in society on a piecemeal and 
ad hoc basis without substantial attention to the cumula­
tive and interrelated effects of the interventions. When 
the cumulative and interrelated effects of public policy 
in separate areas are negative, the correction of the 
situation lies in the direction of greater planning. I.e. 
coordinating the actions in the separate policy spheres 
with each other. The more extensive efforts to plan public 
policy may entail greater or lesser restrictions on 
individual freedom of choice depending on the nature of 
the decisions made and implemented in the planning process.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In an interdependent world, even the proposals 
for escape from that world require planning. The 
character and extent of current state intervention into 
society is such that to reduce in a major way the extent 
of intervention requires the deliberate coordination of 
policies in that direction. Likewise, the utopian vision 
of unraveling the interdependent structures of society 
and returning to self-sufficient and independent commu­
nities— a vision of creating a world in which large 
scale public planning is no longer necessary— requires 
the implementation of a coordinated set of public 
policies. In this case, the policies to be implemented 
would include substantial state intervention in society 
on matters related to the technology and organization of 
economic production.
The judgment that planning is a consequence instead 
of a determinant cause of the extension of state inter­
vention in society was suggested by Gunnar f%rrdal in his 
review of the rise of planning in various Western societies, 
Although written nearly twenty years ago, the circumstances 
that Myrdal described as fostering increased planning 
serve as a reasonable generalization about the charac­
teristics and status of public policy in the United States 
in the 19?0’s:
As a matter of plain historical fact, state inter­
vention in Western countries has not been the 
outcome of a conscious decision to plan, but has
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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generally preceded planning . . . .
What happened was that, as measures of state 
Intervention in a particular field grew in volume 
and in complexity, attempts to coordinate them more 
rationally had from time to time to be thrown into 
this development— 'putting the yeast in the oven 
after the bread,* as the peasant's expressive meta­
phor runs. Such attempts at coordination were 
forced upon the state: when it turned out to have
been an illusion that the need for a particular 
intervention was only temporary ; when the acts of 
intervention proved to have disturbing effects, 
often far outside the field where they were applied, 
effects which had not been taken into account at the 
time the measures had been decided upon; when their 
lack of compatibility with each other and with other 
aims and policies of the national community stood out 
as irrational and damaging; and when they created 
serious administrative difficulties.4
Myrdal also argued that planning, when it has been under­
taken in Western countries, has been adopted on a limited 
and piecemeal basis. His findings are consistent with 
the perspective of this paper that planning is practiced 
in the United States on a partial basis in separate policy 
spheres,
Myrdal's description of the circumstauices that 
occasion planning highlights the fact that underlying any 
planning effort is a desire by the advocates of planning 
to achieve results different from those that occur in the 
absence of planning. As Carl Friedrich has stated,
”. . .  all planning presupposes a basic decision as to 
what is to be the results of the plan.”5 Moreover, by 
the definition of planning adopted in this paper, those 
results are to be achieved through affecting various 
interrelated activities. Consequently, planning involves
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the adoption of general policies that declare the results
desired and the strategies for accomplishing these results
that take account of the relationships among activities
in different subject areas. These general policies
involve the statement of the terms on which the activities
to be planned are to be coordinated.
The development of the general policies of
planning involves knowledge and decisions of more than
a technical character. Planning involves knowledge,
debate, and decisions concerning public values, Friedrich
stated the point as follows:
The clamour for planning, misunderstood as tech- 
nicalization of value-related decisions and policies, 
is ill-conceived. Planning only makes sense, to 
repeat it once more « within the context of rational 
decision-making based upon prevailing, in other words 
communal values and beliefs. (emphasis in original) °
In addition, if planning involves the coordination of
interrelated activities, knowledge and decisions concerning
such interrelationships are required. Making planning
decisions of this type Involves the use of what Karl
Mannheim termed “substantial rationality," which he
defined as "an act of thought which reveals intelligent
insight into the inter-relations of events in a given
situation" and the "capacity for independent judgment,"
Mannheim distinguished substantial rationality from what
he termed "functional rationality," essentially technical
or expert knowledge necessary to relate means to given
ends efficiently,7
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The development of this taxonomy of knowledge and 
decisions should not create the impression that these 
different kinds of knowledge are clearly separable within 
planning. The questions arising in the actual practice 
of planning typically involve an interrelated set of 
decisions to be made concerning values. Interrelationships 
among activities, and techniques of relating means to 
ends. The integration of these types of knowledge is 
evident throughout the process of planning, but especially 
so at the stage of developing any general policies to 
guide the remainder of the process.
General policies are not sufficient by themselves 
to insure the coordination of the activities being planned. 
An interactive process is required between the general 
policies and the decisions within the different spheres 
of activity. The features of such an interactive process 
have been described by Russell Ackoff:
Sets of decisions that require planning have the 
following important characteristics:
a. They are too large to handle all at once. 
Therefore planning must be divided into stages or 
phases that are performed either sequentially by 
one decision-making body, or simultaneously by 
different bodies, or by some combination of sequen­
tial and simultaneous efforts. Planning must be 
staged or, put another way, it must itself be planned.
b. The set of necessary decisions cannot be 
subdivided into independent subsets. Hence a planning 
problem cannot be broken down into Independent sub- 
planning problems. The subplanning problems must be 
interrelated. This means that decisions made early
in the planning process must be taken into account 
when making decisions later on in the process and 
the earlier decisions must be reviewed in light of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the decisions made subsequent to them. (emphasis 
In original
Through an Interactive process general policies are not 
only applied to specific areas of activity, but the 
general policies themselves may also be adjusted on the 
basis of the interaction with the specific.
An additional characteristic of the circumstances 
that require or would benefit from planning is that they 
involve activities that are interrelated over a long 
period of time because decisions, once made, are difficult 
if not impossible to reverse. Examples of decisions with 
irreversible consequences include going to war or depleting 
a non-renewable resource. Decisions that are difficult 
to reverse often involve commitments to public or private 
capital investments. Other difficult-to-reverse decisions 
involve the creation or maintenance of a substantial 
relationship of power in society. Examples include the 
establishment of the Social Security system or the 
granting of the authority for a profession to regulate 
its own membership.
The description offered here of planning and the 
circumstances that occasion it has certain definite 
implications for the relationship between planning aind 
politics. One obvious implication is that planning is 
not a purely technical activity, but is a form or aspect 
of politics. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of an 
activity so directly involved in the formation and
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coordination of public policy as being other than a 
political activity. Norton Long has stated the case 
simply and bluntly; "Plans are policies and policies, 
in a democracy at any rate, spell politics."9
Prom a democratic perspective, the normative 
implication of planning as a political activity is that 
planning in both its design and operation should be 
responsive and accountable to the public through the 
political process. This implication is obvious, but 
•working it out in practice is not. Political questions —  
questions of values, of the appropriateness of both the 
purposes and methods of public policies— are involved 
throughout the continuous and interactive process of 
planning. Both general policies of planning and policies 
in specific areas evolve and are reformulated as they are 
made to interact with each other in planning. If planning 
is to be accountable to the public, the larger political 
process of society must be linked to the planning process 
in a manner that provides for effective public control at 
whatever stage policy is formed. Importantly, the political 
process should insure that public control exercised at one 
stage of planning is not lost at another.
A special demand is made on the public by decisions 
that are difficult or impossible to reverse. To achieve 
public accountability in these cases, the public needs 
to be able to provide guidance for these decision prior
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to their being made. In addition, given the importance 
of technical questions to planning and the fact that 
those technical questions are intertwined with questions 
of values and beliefs, the general standard of account­
ability requires that the technical knowledge of experts 
be translated into terms that can be dealt with by the 
public and that other arrangements exist as are necessary 
to make the expert clearly subordinate to the public.
The implications of failing to make the expert 
accountable to the public can be understood by examining 
arguments that have been made for leaving planning to 
the planners. In 1968, the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development sponsored an international 
symposium on planning conducted by and for planners.
The introductory contribution to the symposium was a 
paper by Salvador de Madariaga on the subject "Planning 
for Freedom," Madariaga addressed the question of who 
is to plan the planners as follows:
It would appear therefore that planning should 
be preceded by a certain amount of planning of 
planning. To echo a classical piece of advice: 
planner. plan yourself. We should plan our plans.
We should carefully survey the reality before us 
to size up its measurable and so to speak mechanical 
sector, that part of it which would eventually admit 
of statistical-mechanical solutions; and this done, 
limit the rigid part of our planning to that sector; 
then organise the rest so as to marshall, guide 
and coordinate the free, spontaneous creativeness 
of institutions and individuals, allowing for their 
qualities, differences, experience, traditions, 
hopes and even, when not uncooperative, prejudices; 
thus aiming as best we can at a happy alliance of
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the craving of thought for definiteness and the no 
less craving of life for the indefinite and the 
unexpected : the wall and the rose on the wall,
(emphasis in original)10
In Madariaga's world, individuals would be allowed a "free,
spontaneous creativeness," but only as marshalled, guided
and coordinated by the planner. The individual need fear
only if his prejudices are "uncooperative." At least we
can take pleasure from a pretty image: we would be like
the "rose on the wall," planted where the planner wanted
us. Fortunately, Madariaga's stating this view does not
make it so. But it does lend credence to the position
that planning should not be left to planning experts.
These, in summary, are the major points of this
section :
1. Public planning is an aspect of politics that 
involves the deliberate coordination of interrelated 
activities undertaken or influenced by the state.
2. Public planning is largely a consequence of 
prior intervention of the state in society- 
interventions that were not substantially coordinated 
with each other.
3. More extensive public planning may involve greater 
or lesser restrictions on individual freedom of choice 
depending on the nature of the decision made and 
implemented in the planning process.
4. Planning, as defined in this paper, involves the 
following activities or processes:
a. the adoption of general policies that 
declare the results desired from planning 
and the strategies for accomplishing the 
results that take account of the relationship 
among activities in different subject areas;
b. the use of knowledge and the making of 
decisions concerning values, interrelationships
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among activities, and techniques of applying 
means to chosen ends ; and
c, the conduct of a continuous and inter­
active process of adopting general policies, 
applying those general policies to specific 
areas, and reformulating general policies 
based on their application.
5. The activities that require planning frequently 
involve circumstances of interrelationships over 
time where decisions made today are difficult to 
reverse and have substantial future consequences.
6. Normative implications, from a general democratic 
perspective, of planning as an aspect of politics 
include the following:
a. The larger political process of society 
should be linked to the planning process in 
a manner that provides for effective public 
control at whatever stage policy is formed.
b. In cases of decisions that are difficult 
or impossible to reverse, the public should
be able to provide guidance for these decisions 
prior to their being made.
c. The intertwining of technical knowledge. 
Insight into interrelationships, and value 
judgments in planning decisions creates the 
need for translating technical knowledge into 
terms that can be understood by the public 
and for any other arrangements that clearly 
subordinate planning experts to the public,
d. The planning of planning is a matter that 
should be determined by the public in the polit- 
ibal process and not left to the planners.
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CHAPTER II
PLANNING AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES
If planning is a form of politics, it would 
seem to follow that, as Robert Lekachman predicts,
"planning will reflect the distribution of power and 
influence" in society.1 Indeed, the conduct of planning 
is enmeshed within those networks of alliances among 
specialized agencies, interest groups, professional 
guilds, and legislative committees described by numerous 
observers of American politics. Theodore Lowi describes 
these networks of alliances as "interest group liberalism," 
and Daniel Ogden refers to them as "power clusters."2
Lowi offers a thoroughgoing indictment of interest
group liberalism, and among his charges is that
Liberal governments cannot plan. Planning requires 
the authoritative use of authority. Planning 
requires law, choice, priorities, moralities.
Liberalism replaces planning with bargaining. Yet 
at bottom, power is unacceptable without planning.
Application of pluralist principles in the 
construction of liberal government has made it 
possible for government to expand its efforts but 
not ^  assemble them, (emphasis added)3
The interpretation in this paper is not that planning
is not done, but that it is done in a fragmented manner
that results, in Harold Seidman*s terms, in "treating
26
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separately things which are inseparable."^ Clusters of 
power for different subject areas dominate planning 
or policy formation for their areas and resist, thus 
far successfully, efforts to make that planning account­
able to a general planning process that is open and 
responsive to the general public. Planning, in Lowi *s 
sense of assembling government action in a manner that 
overcomes the fragmentation of policy-making into 
separate spheres, is not done at the national level.
This type of planning would attempt to integrate inter­
related activities of the state; it is the type of planning 
that this paper advocates be established and conducted 
through democratic procedures.
The pattern of the conduct of partial planning 
at the federal level can be understood by reviewing 
the different types of planning conducted in the United 
States. For this review a taxonomy is used that classi­
fies planning in terms of a vertical scale of the scope 
of planning and a horizontal scale of the elements on 
which the planning is based. The scope of planning 
refers to the range of public activities covered by the 
planning effort. Pour levels of planning that vary in 
scope from broad to narrow are identified on the vertical 
scale: general, functional, program, and project plan­
ning. The horizontal scale involves two elements of 
planning that vary in opposite directions: goals and means.
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Actual planning occurs at various locations in between 
the extremes because goals and means are not completely 
independent of each other, i.e. certain goals imply 
certain means appropriate to them and vice versa. End­
point cases are likely to be more a matter of hypothetical 
speculation actual fact.
At the first level, the category of general 
planning corresponds to the concept of planning developed 
in the previous chapter. The discussion proceeds here 
in largely conceptual terms because general planning is 
not undertaken at the national level in the United States 
today. It is attempted, however, by several state govern­
ments, and the practice of general planning emerging in 
state governments tends to follow the conceptual terms 
used to define this category.
The scope of general planning is the set of inter­
related activities of the state. General planning involves 
both the adoption of general policies to coordinate inter­
related public activities and the maintenance of a process 
of applying the general policies to specific areas. For 
general planning to be effective, the general policies 
of planning would specify overall results and strategies 
for accomplishing those results in terms sufficiently 
broad to cover the interrelated activities, but suffi­
ciently specific to provide effective guidance to those 
activities. Effective general planning does not require
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a kind of total, blueprint planning of the details of 
interrelated activities, but it does require the develop­
ment of general policies that are capable of being 
applied to specific oases. In addition, general planning 
both as a concept and as it has developed in state gov­
ernments involves the consideration in relation to each 
other of the relevant goals and means associated with 
the activities being planned. Thus, general planning 
rests in the center of the scale between goals-based 
and means-based planning.
All fifty states have created some type of policy 
planning agency. In a majority of these states, the 
agency is authorized to conduct both types of the major 
activities included in general planning: the development
of general policies and the maintenance of a mechanism 
for applying general policies to specific subject areas.
As of 1977» thirty-four state governments had legislation 
authorizing the policy planning agency to prepare a 
general or comprehensive plan to serve as a tool for 
coordinating state government activities and planning in 
separate policy areas,5 Moreover, the authority to main­
tain a mechanism for applying general policies to specific 
subject areas is even more widespread, with every state 
policy planning agency charged with some major role in 
coordinating and reviewing the planning activities of 
other state agencies.&
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Frequently, the mechanism for applying general 
policies to specific areas consists of the state planning 
agency serving as the "state clearinghouse" under the 
procedures established by the Office of Management and 
Budget Circular A-95. Among other provisions of Circular 
A-95» state governors are given an opportunity to review 
and comment on federally-assisted state plans and, for 
certain programs, federal grant requests that originate 
from within their states,7 State clearinghouses perform 
the central staff functions for these procedures and 
advise governors on policy issues that arise in the 
process. The purpose of the gubernatorial review of 
federally-assisted state plans is, according to the 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
"to permit the governor to relate development strategies 
among the Federally supported state programs to each 
other and to any overall strategies developed through 
the state comprehensive planning process."8 Prom this 
perspective, the A-95 process is intended to be one 
mechanism for the implementation of general planning.
State legislation has also often provided a method
for applying general policies to specific policy areas.
Typical of state laws providing for a state planning
coordination function is the following Utah statute*
The state planning co-ordinator shall:
. . . Receive and review plans of the various 
state agencies and local subdivisions of government
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relating to public improvements and programs.
Where conflicts occur between the plans and 
proposals of state agencies, the state planning 
co-ordinator shall prepare specific recommendations 
for the resolution of such conflicts and submit 
his recommendations to the governor who shall make
the decision resolving the conflict.9
Despite the existence of legal mechanisms for a 
majority of state governments to each develop general 
policies and to apply them to specific policy areas, 
general planning is largely frustrated at the state level. 
Chief among the reasons that general planning is not 
more successful at the state level is the fragmentation 
of policy-making at the federal level— a fragmentation 
that is too difficult for a state or locality to overcome. 
Exploring the implications of this fragmentation for plan­
ning is a major concern of the remainder of this chapter.
The second level of planning in the taxonomy is 
functional planning. The scope of functional planning 
is a set of activities that are related either because 
l) they are related to a goal or goals in a subject area, 
or 2) they are related by using a common set of resources, 
or 3) they are related both ways. At the level of 
functional planning, the distinction between goals-based 
and means-based planning becomes relevant.
Goals-based functional planning emphasizes a 
goal or goals that are specified within a fixed range if 
not at a point and attempts to determine the means for 
accomplishing the goals. There are not many examples of
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goals-based functional planning in the United States,
The major one at the federal level is the Pull Employment 
and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, which amends the Employ­
ment Act of 1946.
Means-based functional planning takes as fixed 
(or to be varied within a fixed range) a set of resources 
or a method and considers the allocation of the resources 
or the employment of the method in the light of alterna­
tive competing goals. Examples of this type of planning 
are numerous. They include such activities as multiple- 
use forest planning, a river basin development plan, and 
land use plans. Budget formulation, strictly speaking, 
falls into this category although it has some character­
istics of general planning because of the range of 
activities it affects. A specific case of means-based 
functional planning, the National Health Planning and 
Resources Development Act of 1974, will be discussed 
later in this chapter.
An example of functional planning that involves 
an effort to specify both goals and means In relation to 
each other (as opposed to specifying one and allowing the 
other to vary to an uncertain degree) is provided by the 
Federal Clean Water Act of 1977 and the 1972 Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments. These acts 
include the specification of goals— fishable and swimmable 
waters by 1983 and, ultimately, the zero-discharge of
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wastes Into waterways. These laws also specify in 
definite and detailed ways the nature and limits of 
the legal authority and funding to be utilized in 
pursuing these goals. Formulation of policy in these 
terms is an example of the kind of functional planning 
that would be the appropriate extension of general 
planning if general planning were practiced at the 
federal level.
The third level of planning— program planning—  
involves a subset of activities within an area covered by 
functional planning. Goals-based program planning involves 
a specific, defined objective or set of objectives plus 
resources and methods that can be varied within a fixed 
range. Examples of this type of planning are a transpor­
tation plan, an agricultural income support policy, or a 
recreational plan. Means-based program planning involves 
fixed resources, methods that can be varied within limits 
and choices among multiple, but defined objectives, A 
timber management plan or a capital improvements plan 
would fall into this category.
The same distinctions between goals-based and 
means-based planning exist at the specific activity or 
project level, and so will not be recounted again. An 
example of a goals-based activity or project plan is a 
campground plan. A means-based project plan is, for 
example, a water project plan.
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Either goals-based or means-based planning at the 
program or project levels may descend from means-based 
functional planning. Whether it is means or goals- 
based at these levels depends on how successfully the 
groups doing the planning have captured both fired 
resources and the discretion to choose among the goals 
to be served by those resources. When planning occurs in 
a means-based form at this level of planning, it is an 
indication of the success of a specific group or set of 
groups in capturing the policy formation processes for the 
activities being planned. When means-based planning of a 
very specific character, such as planning for a water 
project, occurs without guidance from an overall planning 
or policy process, the fragmentation of policy-making 
becomes apparent. Planning for such a project assumes 
the characteristics of higher levels of planning because 
it, in fact, assumes the roles of those higher levels. In
these cases, general policy as it applies to the particu­
lar activity being planned is clearly controlled by 
specific groups.
The same conclusion can be extended to the function­
al level. The prevalence of means-based functional planning 
is a result of groups capturing legal, fiscal, and other 
resources to use for purposes they determine. The domi­
nance of planning of this type is a symptom of the frag­
mentation of governmental authority in the United States.
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It should not be surprising that specific groups 
that control general public policy as it applies to a 
particular set of activities will resist the transfer of 
the making of that general policy to a larger political 
process. It was this type of resistance that contributed 
to the demise of the National Resources Planning Board, 
an embryonic general planning mechanism spawned by the 
New Deal. Although the Board engaged in innovative 
studies of national policies, it never became a vehicle 
for effectively integrating the formation and guidance of 
national policy. However, because of the Board's potential 
for becoming a general planning mechanism, it represented 
a potential threat to the independence of both established 
and newly arising power clusters in specialized areas. 
Importantly, the Corps of Engineers played an instru­
mental role in securing the abolition of the Board during 
World War 11.10
Problems associated with the absence of a general 
planning mechanism emerge from looking at specific cases 
of functional planning. The Pull Employment and Balanced 
Growth Act is significant because it represents an effort 
by Congress to specify macroeconomic goals. The act is 
flawed, however, by an incomplete consideration of the 
relationship between the goals and the means of accom­
plishing them. Congress did not determine in the act how 
the goals should be accomplished; it asked the President
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to determine the means. Avoiding the question of means. 
Congress could specify ambitious goals— 3 percent unem­
ployment and 3 percent inflation in five years— without 
confronting the question of how realistic the goals 
were. The recent record of stagflation raises serious 
doubts about the feasibility of achieving these goals 
through the use of current macroeconomic policy instruments, 
The Health Planning and Resource Development Act 
represents an example of how means-based planning occurs 
when a specific set of groups capture the authority to 
make general policy as it applies to a particular subject 
area. Congress did not specify definite goals in the law, 
but made only general statements about the quality, 
character, and cost of health care. The law does, however, 
elaborately detail the process by which special groups 
will be able to exercise authority and expend public funds. 
This law authorizes local health systems agencies, 
predominantly of a private, non-profit character, to 
perform certain key health manpower and facilities plan­
ning functions. Although 51 percent consumer representa­
tion is required on the boards of such agencies, provider 
groups are organized and employ professional staffs to 
provide expert information to their also presumedly expert, 
professional representatives on the local boards. Con­
sumers typically have no similar access to expert resources. 
Most importantly, the lines of accountability between the
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health systems agencies and the general public are weak. 
This law guarantees to certain groups the authority to 
make specific kinds of health policy. It does not 
guarantee to the public any particular health care 
benefits, nor does it offer any ready method for the 
public to correct the activities of a health systems 
agency if the public desired some correction.
The Pull Employment and Balanced Growth Act 
suggests that goals-based planning involves promises to 
deliver benefits without any corresponding promise to 
undertake the proper means and to incur the proper costs 
necessary to achieve those benefits. In contrast, the 
Health Planning and Resource Development Act suggest that 
means-based planning involves promises to undertake certain 
means and incur certain costs without a corresponding 
promise to deliver benefits of any particular kind. Both 
laws suggest the need for planning that relates means and 
ends to each other.
There is the further need to relate planning in 
one functional area to that in other areas. The economic, 
health care, and water pollution control laws discussed 
above each proceed without being effectively related to 
each other. The quality of the environment impacts 
health care planning and policy. Both are related to 
economic policy in a number of ways, including levels of 
investments required and impacts on price levels and
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productivity. These matters are not addressed directly 
in the absence of a general planning process.
The general planning process advocated in this 
paper has been described to this point as consisting 
of two interrelated parts : 1) the development of general
policies that state desired results and strategies for 
achieving those results for the activities being planned, 
and 2) a process of applying the general policies to 
activities in specific areas through the review of the 
plans for those activities. It should be added that the 
typcial expectation would be that when a general policy 
and a specific plan were in conflict, the specific plan 
would be modified. However, the opposite can also be 
the case. A specific plan could lead to the réévaluation 
and change of a general policy.
Although general planning is not practiced at a 
national level in the United States, efforts by some 
state and local governments and areawide planning organi­
zations (usually regional councils of local governments) 
csui help to underscore the points already made about what 
is necessary for an effective general planning process.
An analysis of some efforts at general planning is offered 
here on the basis of knowledge acquired by personal 
experience and observation.11
It has been argued in this paper that general 
planning, to be effective, requires the development of
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general policies. Sucli is evident because general plan­
ning attempts to achieve certain results through the 
deliberate coordination of activities, and general 
policies are the expression of the results desired and 
the strategies for accomplishing them. A further under­
standing of the role of general policies in the coordina­
tion of activities can be achieved through a discussion 
of alternative methods used by states and areawide 
planning organizations for handling A-95 review pro­
cedures .
Although not complete in its review of govern­
mental activities, the A-95 review process is, in its 
intended form, an example of a method of applying general 
policies to specific governmental activities. The 
process is supposed to focus on/a comparison between 
comprehensive state or areawide plans and proposals for 
public activities embodied in grant requests or specific 
plans. The final step of the process, assuming no policy 
conflicts, is supposed to be a certification that a given 
proposal is "not inconsistent" with the plans and policies 
of the jurisdiction doing the reviewing. Environmental 
and minority group impacts are also to be given considera­
tion, along with any conflicts between the proposal and 
other projects or activities in the same area.
Before proceeding to consider the different ways 
that the A-95 process is implemented, some terminological
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clarification is in order. The term **comprehensive” 
was used in the paragraph above because that is the 
term used in Circular A-95 and in most state laws dealing 
with state planning. There is no precise definition of 
a comprehensive plan; it can mean different things 
depending on whether one is considering the purpose and 
function of the plan or the method by which it is pre­
pared. Judging from federal and state legal usage and 
the common understanding of these matters among state 
planners, comprehensive planning, at the level of purpose 
and function. is reasonably the same as general planning: 
both are aimed at coordinating an interrelated set of 
activities. For that reason and to be consistent with 
the taxonomy used in this paper, the term "general" plan 
will be substituted for "comprehensive" plan in discussing 
how A-95 procedures are actually conducted in certain 
jurisdictions. The interchangeability of these terms 
should be understood to occur only at the level of purpose 
and function.
Later in this chapter, comprehensive planning and 
general planning will be distinguished from each other at 
the level of method. The method of comprehensive plan­
ning attempts to analyze and plan everything that a 
governmental jurisdiction or agency can influence. It 
involves inventorying data and projecting trends that 
relate to the full range of governmental activities,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4l
ranking goals for those activities, considering as many 
options for action as possible, and describing chosen 
options in blueprint detail. The method of general plan­
ning focuses the planning effort on a set of priority 
issues. The initial stage of this method involves the 
making of judgments about the most important problems to 
address and the key factors and relationships that affect 
those problems. The collection of information, choice of 
goals, and analysis of options focuses on these problems, 
and recommendations are stated in terms of general guide­
lines for future action as well as necessary immediate 
actions, A comprehensive plan developed through a compre­
hensive method would be an extreme case of a general plan.
In actually conducting the A-95 process, some 
states and even more areawide planning organizations do 
not focus on a comparison between the item being reviewed 
and general plans and policies for the simple fact that 
those entities have not actually developed overall plans. 
In these oases, the review of proposals through the A-95 
process focuses instead on identifying conflicts between 
proposals and the activities of other agencies, as per­
ceived by those agencies. The method of identifying 
conflicts typically consists of distributing the proposal 
to other public agencies to secure their comments on it. 
This method is also employed as an additional procedure 
in the Jurisdictions that do conduct a comparison of the
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relationship between a proposal and a general plan or set 
of policies. In the jurisdictions where such a compari­
son is not undertaken, the "self-determination of con­
flict" process, as it was termed in an American Institute 
of Planners study of functional planning coordination, is 
the principal or exclusive method of fulfilling A-95 
requirements.12
The different procedures used to implement 0MB 
Circular A-95 have a tendency to produce different policy 
results. Relying on the comments that public agencies 
raise in conjunction with proposals of another agency 
tends to focus attention on issues of a technical nature 
instead of issues of purposes, priorities, and methods. 
This pattern occurs for several reasons including:
1. A tendency of agencies to observe a "norm of 
limited comments" that institutionalizes an under­
standing of a log-rolling nature: "If you won't 
comment harshly on our proposals, we won't comment 
harshly on yours next time;"
2. The roles and responsibilities of public agencies 
are sufficiently well defined and separated that few 
really fundamental conflicts occur among agencies
at the same governmental level ; and
3. As a consequence of the factor just mentioned, 
public agencies do not necessarily perceive or have 
a strong interest in or concern for problems that 
tend to cut across agency lines and that are the 
cumulative and indirect consequences of the actions 
of specific agencies properly carrying out their 
responsibilities,
The analysis of these factors will help to illustrate that
the A-95 process, when conducted solely on a self-
determination of conflict basis, leads to the systematic
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exclusion from consideration of certain kinds of public 
problems,
Agencies tend to observe the norm of limited 
comments because typically there is little that they 
have to gain from making negative comments on another 
agency's proposal, and potentially a great deal that 
they have to lose. Because the areas of responsibility 
of agencies are in most cases reasonably well defined, 
diréot conflicts between a funding proposal of one agency 
with another agency at the same level of government are 
rare. The conflicts that do occur tend to be marginal in 
the sense that the proposal of one agency does not 
directly threaten the performance of activities in the 
major areas of responsibility of other agencies.
In any conflicts that do arise, the final step 
(after initial consultations to resolve the conflict) 
open to an agency objecting to a proposal is to have its 
objections transmitted to the federal agency considering 
the funding proposal. Expressing such objections to 
federal funding sources carries with it the threat that 
funding for the proposal will be delayed or denied. Other 
consequences, such as the transfer of the proposed grant 
from one agency to another, are extremely rare and are 
generally precluded by the terms and conditions of the 
categorical grant-in-aid system. Categories of aid 
generally are focused on specific purposes and carry
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with them eligibility requirements for the receipt of 
aid, including the Important single state agency require­
ment.13 These eligibility requirements mark the boundaries 
of agency territory within the grant-in-aid system.
The possibility of the loss of federal funds (and 
their consequent transfer to another state) appears to 
be a negative result grossly out of proportion to what 
is typically involved in an interagency conflict over a 
funding proposal. In addition, an agency that does choose 
to pursue an objection too vigorously is viewed as viola­
ting the grant territory of another agency and is likely 
to invite similar treatment when its own proposals for 
federal funding are reviewed. There are few state agencies 
that do not participate in some aspect of the grant-in-aid 
system, and protecting one’s own grant request or plan 
of activities is generally more important than influencing 
the proposals of another agency.
The shared understanding that most interagency 
issues are less important than success at securing federal 
funds, the mutual respect for each other’s grant terri­
tory, and the threat of having one's own funding pro­
posal reviewed critically if too much protest is made 
over another’s proposal help to insure that interagency 
comments in the A-95 process are polite and routine. But 
the inadequacy of interagency comments as a basis of 
coordination cannot really be explained in terms of these
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aspects of political culture and psychology. Even if 
these factors were entirely removed, interagency comments 
would still be inherently aimed at primarily marginal 
issues. The problems that give rise to efforts at coor­
dination are of the nature of externalities--cumulative and 
interrelated effects of each agency properly doing its 
own job. These external effects are not the province of 
any particular agency and cannot be adequately perceived 
from'the perspective of those who are responsible for only 
part of a total problem and who help to create the problem 
by doing their assigned tasks well.
This point can be understood better through the 
use of an example. In the past two decades a number of 
federal and state programs have been jointly undertaken 
that place requirements for public services and invest­
ments that are relatively more costly on a per unit of 
service or per capita basis for small, rural communities 
than for larger, urban communities. These programs have 
involved such matters as upgrading rural ambulance and 
other emergency medical services, renovating water and 
sewer systems, upgrading methods of solid waste disposal, 
requiring additional training and education for local 
police, and maintaining or upgrading standards for local 
roads. The cumulative effect of these programs on the 
budgets of rural communities (and, hence, on the budgets 
of the residents of those communities) was often
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devastating and tended to reduce the economic viability 
of many of these communities.
The cumulative effect of the mostly federal 
social and environmental programs on the economics of 
small, rural communities was often not the concern of any 
particular state agency. Thus, in an A-95 review process 
that relied solely on interagency comments, the overall 
problem of those communities being able to finance the 
required services would not be identified. For instance, 
if a state plan for sewer and waste treatment facilities 
was under review, the state agency responsible for pre­
paring the state emergency medical service plan would 
probably indicate some support for the sewer and waste 
treatment facility plan because of its generally positive 
effect on public health. State law enforcement training 
officials would likely have no comment or would not have 
been sent the plan in the first place. State highway 
officials would also have no comment, except to note any 
infrequent cases where the timing of the construction of 
a sewer line would need to be coordinated with the timing 
of the reconstruction or resurfacing of a highway through 
a community. The latter is precisely the kind of techni­
cal problem that tends to be Identified in the self- 
determination of conflict mode of the A-95 process. But 
none of these agencies would be likely to identify the 
cumulative fiscal impact of the sewer and waste treatment
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plan and other plans on the budgets of rural commu­
nities.
A process of reviewing individual activities 
in the absence of any general policy perspective to guide 
that review will not result in effective coordination 
to solve problems that are the cumulative result of a 
number of individual activities. Those problems are 
not even likely to be identified, let alone addressed 
thrdugh a coherent set of policies. Without a coherent 
set of policies to serve as standards to judge individual 
activities, almost all of the items being reviewed will 
be judged to be satisfactory.
Melvin Mogulof, a researcher who studied the 
conduct of the A-95 review process by regional councils 
of government in 1970 and 1971» came to a similar con­
clusion. Noting that most councils did not have regional 
plans or policies against which they could review indi­
vidual grant applications, he concluded that
The grossest and most overwhelming failure of the 
A-95 process is its great difficulty in distin­
guishing between good and bad applications from a 
regional point of view. On a de facto basis almost 
everything is good— because the system finds that 
almost nothing is bad.15
The review of individual activities is essentially meaning­
less unless there is some basis for distinguishing the 
important from the unimportant, the good from the bad, 
and the consistent from the inconsistent. That basis can 
provided by general policies that express results
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that are desired and overall strategies for accomplish­
ing them.
General policies without a process of reviewing 
and applying those policies to individual activities is 
also meaningless in terms of trying to coordinate those 
activities in the achievement of desired results. The 
stereotype of planning as an activity in which planners 
produce plans that sit on the shelf has a certain factual 
basis. Planners are frequently dismayed that decision­
makers ignore their plans. What planners often fail to 
consider is that their plans may be ignored for good 
reasons.
It was noted earlier that at least thirty-four 
of the state governments have the necessary authorizing 
legislation for the development of general plans. The 
language of such legislation, following the jargon of 
the planning profession, refers to "comprehensive" plans 
instead of general plans. The idea that general plans 
should be comprehensive has been an obstacle to both the 
preparation and application of such plans. If reviewing 
activities without the guidance of general policies 
results in the erroneous conclusion that there are few 
important relationships among different public activities, 
the attempt to be comprehensive makes the erroneous 
assumption that everything is related in ^  important 
way to everything else. Hence, the comprehensive approach
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proceeds on the basis that everything should at least 
be studied for planning if not actually planned.
In practice, the comprehensive approach involves 
the collection of large quantities of data relating to 
matters that might be affected by the planning. The 
inventory of data may proceed to a projection of trends 
based on the assumption of the past continuing into the 
future. Next to the inventory of data and projection of 
trehds is juxtaposed a priority ranking of goals (“supplied 
by decision-makers") and from that juxtaposition a blue­
print of as detailed a set of recommendations as possible 
is produced. The hallmark of the comprehensive method 
is the use of expert resources, and its spirit and 
impulse is to study everything.
The effort to study everything, to be comprehensive, 
typically yields one of two results. It either paralyzes 
the planning effort and stops a plan from being prepared, 
or it culminates in a voluminous document full of too 
much data and technical analysis— often already out of 
date at its time of publication— and very little of any­
thing that can be used as an effective guide in coordina­
ting different activities of government. The political 
process typically deals with a “comprehensive" plan by 
greeting its completion ceremoniously and then proceeding 
to ignore it in practice.
Some states have avoided the problems of
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comprehensive planning by developing a method that is 
appropriate to implementing the concept of general 
planning discussed in this paper,17 Instead of beginning 
with the collection and analysis of large quantities of 
data, the method of general planning begins with judgments 
concerning the major problems or circumstances to be 
given attention and the general character of the results 
that are desired. Combined with these judgments of values 
are judgments concerning the key relationships that affect 
the problems or circumstances being examined. These 
judgments involve the exercise of the kind of substantial 
rationality as suggested by Mannheim and discussed in 
the previous chapter. These judgments of value and 
insight are then employed to guide the technical analysis 
necessary to complete the planning process. Technical 
analysis may reveal conditions and circumstances that 
require a change in the initial judgments made, but the 
guidance of the process by judgments of what is important 
to study and plan continues throughout. Out of this process 
statements of results and strategies of accomplishing them 
are produced that can be used to evaluate individual 
cases of government activity.
This method has been most successfully applied 
in Massachusetts where conflicting goals for economic 
growth, community preservation, and environmental 
protection are reconciled, on a policy level, through
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a growth policy that focuses on the revitalization of 
existing urban centers,1® In developing the recommenda­
tions for revitalizing urban centers, there has been an 
obvious focus on what are judged to be the key govern­
mental activities that affect the results that are 
desired— these, activities principally being certain 
public investment suid development regulation decisions. 
The general policy has been applied through the review 
of individual activities in the A-95 process and other 
internal review processes of Massachusetts state 
government. The growth policy was first stated in 1975 
eind updated in 1977; it is stated in understandable terms 
that correspond to the categories of desired results and 
strategies for accomplishing the results. The policy 
has not been a "plan on the shelf," Its implementation 
has been sufficient to lead the authors of the American 
Institute of Planners study to conclude that the policy 
had been "a significant factor in the administration of 
state programs."19
An important characteristic of the Massachusetts 
growth policy is that it has been stated in terms that 
can be understood and debated by the public and that 
can be readily changed as circumstances and preferences 
change. The problem of overly technical comprehensive 
plans that become outdated as soon as they are published 
is avoided in this approach because policies are developed
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and stated in terms that make them relevent over time, 
but also subject to change through the political process.
For example, the Massachusetts growth policy 
report includes eight general policy recommendations to 
serve as guides for governmental activities and thirty-six 
“action recommendations" involving measures to implement 
the general policies. Among the general policy recom­
mendations is the following one concerning the location 
of growth:
It is the policy of the Commonwealth that growth 
should be channeled primarily into developed 
rather than outlying areas, especially into city 
and town centers, and discouraged in critical 
environmental areas, consistent with individual 
communities* willingness and ability to accommodategrowth.20
This policy is supplemented by an explanatory statement 
that defines such phrases as “critical environmental 
areas" and "ability to accommodate growth" and that 
explains the idea of centers on both a regional and 
local basis. This statement concerning the location 
of growth is a reasonably clear policy that could be 
used to direct a number of actions over time, but that 
could also be changed relatively easily. The policy is 
specific enough to be applied to particular oases, but 
general enough to be appled to a variety of cases.
Additional meaning is given to this general 
policy by several "action recommendations" in the 
report that are relevent to it.21 These recommendations
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
53
deal with matters such as the location of public invest­
ments, prohibiting geographic discrimination against 
older neighborhoods in lending decisions, encouraging 
center revitalization programs, sharing industrial property 
taxes, and several other topics. These action recommenda­
tions help to clarify the intent of the general policy 
as well as provide a means for its implementation. They 
are also subject to modification as circumstances change. 
Importantly, the action recommendations illustrate the fact 
that the general policy is to be implemented primarily 
through governmental activities that are subject to 
the authority of state government.
This last point is an important one, because 
state government efforts at general planning are often 
frustrated by the fact that the important governmental 
activities that relate to a problem are often subject to 
federal instead of state control. The problem cited 
earlier of the fiscal difficulties of small, rural 
communities was created primarily by federal laws and 
regulations. General planning at the state and local 
level simply cannot adequately address problems created 
by the fragmented character of federal policies. Those 
problems require a general planning mechanism at the 
federal level. Creating and maintaining such a mechanism 
requires the mobilization of political power to overcome 
and bring to account the clusters of power that control
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policy in separate areas. How to mobilize and exercise 
that power through democratic procedures is the major 
concern of this paper. Addressing that concern requires 
some understanding of what is meant here by the term 
"democratic procedures."
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CHAPTER III 
DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES
At the conclusion of Chapter I, normative impli­
cations of planning were derived from a general perspec­
tive that democracy is a condition in which public policy 
is responsive and accountable to the public. This chapter 
attempts to clarify the procedural requirements for the 
accountability of policy to the public. No argument will 
be made here that these procedural requirements for 
democracy comprise a full and adequate model of democracy. 
That there are both procedural and substantive conditions 
for democracy is readily acknowledged. However, only the 
procedural requirements are being considered in detail in 
this paper. Stated differently, this paper explores 
conditions that create an opportunity for democratic 
planning, but it does not explore the conditions that 
guarantee democratic planning.
The substantive requirements for democracy and 
for democratic planning in particular involve extremely 
important and complex issues that ought to be the subject 
of further study through a relaxation of the assumptions 
declared in the introduction. Among the kinds of issues
59
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
that should be addressed in further study are the social 
and economic inequalities that tend to undermine political 
equality within the political process,
Importeuit also to democratic planning are the 
questions, belonging to the general field of the sociology 
of knowledge, concerning the social conditions that con­
tribute to the acquisition of knowledge appropriate to 
participation in a democratic planning process, Mannheim 
emphasized these issues in his argument that functional 
rationalization— the increased specialization of the 
workplace— tends to reduce the degree to which citizens 
are able to develop the ability to exercise the substantial 
rationality necessary for planning.1 Ihe idea of opportu­
nities for participation in society as a means for develop­
ing the citizenship capabilities of individuals is, as 
surveyed in a useful work by Carole Pateman, a theme of 
both some traditional and contemporary theories of demo­
cracy and for which there is some support from empirical 
research.2 in addition, John Friedmann, a leading American 
planning theorist, has made citizen participation a central 
feature in his model of a learning society capable of 
effective planning.3 The importance of these issues for 
further study should not, however, overshadow the importance 
of the procedural questions considered here. Democracy 
cannot exist without democratic procedures.
Procedural elements of democracy are adapted here
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from a model of democracy developed by Austin Ranney 
and Willmoore Kendall.^ Their model of democracy 
emphasizes procedures, but also acknowledges in a general 
manner the social conditions necessary for democracy. 
Their model has been chosen as a base from which to 
work, because unlike some models, this one stresses the 
need for involving citizens in the development of public 
policy instead of merely in the choice of leaders from 
amorig competing candidates. Because of the continuous 
character of policy formation in planning and because 
many key decisions in planning have a practically irre­
versible character, periodic elections of the planners 
is by itself an inadequate guarantee of public control 
of planning. The nature of planning issues makes public 
awareness and understanding of these issues an important 
requirement for public control of planning. Ranney and 
Kendall's model is appropriate to the task of designing 
democratic planning procedures because it recognizes the 
need for citizens to have opportunities to participate 
in and understand public policies.
The summary elements of the Ranney and Kendall 
model, in their own terms, are as follows :
1, Popular sovereignty. The whole power of govern­
ment resides in the whole people~that is, in all 
the members of the community, and not in any special 
ruling class or in any single individual.
2. Political equality. Each member of the community 
has the same formal right as all the other members to
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participate in the community’s total decision­
making process.
3. Popular consultation, a. The community's laws 
are made by a representative assembly.
b. The electoral arrangements for selecting 
members of the representative assembly are such 
that the assembly will be as subordinate to the 
people as the latter wish it to be.
c. Failing b., the members of the assembly 
make decisions as the whole people would make them 
if the latter were present and voting,
d. The assembly supervises, holds accountable, 
and has full control over all other public officials.
e. There are arrangements for communicating to 
the people full factual knowledge and understanding 
•of all public problems they wish to do something 
about.
f. The citizens participate in the development 
of proposals for public policy as well as give or 
withhold consent to such proposals,
4. Majority rule, a. No decision as to public
policy or procedure is deemed valid if opposed by
more than half of the members of the community,
b. A majority of the representative assembly 
has the same power over the assembly's decisions as 
a majority of the town meeting has over the letter's 
decisions.
c. Majorities forbear from tyranny and minorities 
from irredentism and civil war because of a sense of
obligation to do so on the part of all the members of
the community (and of their elected representatives) 
based on the feeling of each that he needs to keep 
all the others loyal to the community if he is to 
realize his own values,
d. Decisions are made after a process of creative 
discussion in which all the members of the community 
are trying to find out what is best for the community.
e. Voting and majority rule are regarded merely 
as makeshifts for getting action when action is 
needed in a hurry and there is not sufficient time 
for a full "sense of the community" to emerge from 
the discussion on the issue in hand, (emphasis in original)5
With the exceptions and modifications noted below, 
this model will be considered here as describing essential 
and desirable conditions with which procedures for
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democratic planning ought to be consistent. The choice 
of this model is based both on the judgment, discussed 
above, concerning its appropriateness to the design of 
democratic planning procedures and on the view that the 
model is very complete in its coverage of the procedural 
elements of democracy. The proposals made for planning 
procedures are, of course contingent on this choice of 
model. If a different model were chosen, different 
procedures might be recommended. Further, it should be 
understood that the planning procedures to be proposed 
later in this paper are designed simply to be consistent 
with this model of democracy and not to guarantee the 
implementation of the model in all its aspects.
In first presenting the concept of popular 
sovereignty, Ranney and Kendall state the position, taken 
from James Bryce, that popular sovereignty applies to the 
"ruling power of the State."6 Ranney and Kendall, with­
out justifying their position, have automatically assumed 
that the government is identical to the state and does 
not include other social institutions, such as corporations 
or labor unions, that might have power to affect the 
interests of the public in a broad and substantial manner, 
Robert Dahl has argued the view that corporations can be 
considered as part of the state as follows :
If we abandon the absurdities in extending 
Locke on private property to ownership or control 
of the modem business corporation, then the rights
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of owners must be seen as secondary in relation 
to the primary rights that are necessary for 
self-government.
and further that:
. . . any large economic enterprise is in principle 
a public enterprise.. It exists not by private 
right but only to meet social goals. Questions 
about these social goals, and the comparative 
advantages and disadvantages of different forms 
are properly in the public domain, matters for 
public discussion, choice, and decision, to be 
determined collectively by processes that satisfy 
the criteria of procedural democracy.7
Prdm Dahl's point of view, corporations are so much a 
“public'* entity that it is not simply a matter of sub­
jecting individual corporate actions or sets of actions 
to public control. He suggests that even the forms of 
the corporations are properly a matter for public control. 
To broaden so thoroughly the degree of corporate affairs 
that are assumed to be in the public domain is to assume 
that corporations, at least large ones, are part of the 
state that should be subject to popular sovereignty.
Sheldon Wolin argues, however, that it is a
mistake to assume that the corporation is a
. . .  political entity and hence susceptible to 
political kinds of questions. My point, however, 
is that an approach of this kind leads to confusions 
because the concept of political responsibility is 
out of place in this context. Political responsibility 
has traditionally connoted a form of responsibility 
owed to a general constituency. . . . °
Interpreting Wolin*s point to mean that politics ought
to be about matters that have a general effect on the
community, is it not possible for powerful social
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Institutions such as corporations to have such a general 
effect? For example, power by corporations (and unions) 
to administer prices for certain widely needed products 
might be interpreted as giving the public an interest 
not only in the specific acts of price administration, 
but also in the source of the power to administer prices. 
Other matters within the domain of the corporation might 
be similarly interpreted as causing the public to become 
a "general constituency" of the corporation: technological
choices, employment practices, investment policies, and 
pollution effects are such examples. The point is that 
whether or not a social institution, such as a corporation, 
ought to be considered a part of the state is an empirical 
matter to be decided in particular cases as a matter of 
public policy by the same means as other public policy 
is determined.
For the above reason, Ranney and Kendall's assump­
tion that no institutions besides government might be 
considered a part of the state is not accepted here.
Instead, popular sovereignty will be considered here to 
apply to the whole power of the state and not only to the 
whole power of government, with the determination of 
what social institutions belong to the state left to 
public policy adopted through a democratic process.
It should be understood that Ranney and Kendall's 
reference to the community's "total decision-making process"
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in their standard of political equality refers to politi­
cal decision-making processes and not to such matters 
as decision-making in the workplace that might be 
emphasized by theorists of participatory democracy. In 
a study of the substantive conditions of democracy, the 
Ranney-Kendall definition of community decision-making 
process would probably need to be modified, but does not 
need to be here in a study of political procedures. More­
over; their intent in their application of political 
equality to the total political decision-making of society 
is to broaden the concept of equality beyond one person, 
one vote in elections to include an equal opportunity 
to participate in developing and choosing among policy 
proposals.9 They carry out their interpretation of the 
applicability of the concept of political equality in 
standards (listed above as 3.e. and 3.f.) which relate 
to public knowledge about and participation in public 
policy-making.
Ranney and Kendall*s standards for political 
equality and popular consultation would seem to require a 
single representative assembly elected on a one person, 
one vote basis and exercising full control over administra­
tive officials— in short, a parliamentary system. This 
impression is reinforced by their statement that
. . .  to the extent that the full powers of the 
people in any nation-state are not concentrated 
in a single elected representative assembly, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
67
to the extent that the electoral arrangements do 
not maximize correspondence between the will of 
the representative assembly and the wishes of the 
electorate, we can call that nation's government 
undemocratic, (emphasis in o r i g i n a l
They adjust their criteria for the representative
assembly, however, to include the notion that an assembly
is democratic if it makes decisions as the whole public
would if the public were meeting. On this basis they
later conclude that the U.S. Congress, even with separate
hoiises, incomplete control of the executive, and a non-
majoritarian Senate, is reasonably democratic because it
can respond to the will of more than temporary majorities
distributed somewhat evenly across the nation.11 This
movement away from a precise standard of a democratic
representative assembly to a somewhat flexible and
subjective standard is only one example of efforts by
Ranney and Kendall to fit their concept of democracy to
the United States and thereby to justify the nation as
being reasonably democratic.
The qualification that Congress is democratic 
according to majoritarian standards if majority opinion 
is relatively evenly distributed across the nation is a 
significant qualification because of the importance of 
some of the issues on which majority opinion has been or 
is distributed unevenly. The difficulty of enacting civil 
rights legislation in recent decades and the continued 
support in the Senate for the funding of programs
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benefiting rural areas are but two examples of how 
overrepresentation of certain interests in the Senate 
has had, at various times, non-majoritarian consequences. 
Nonetheless, this paper will develop the proposal for 
democratic planning assuming the existing constitutional 
structure of the executive and legislative brsuiches, but 
not because there is agreement with Ranney and Kendall's 
judgment concerning the consistency of that structure 
with their model of democracy. The proposals will be 
designed to operate in the context of the existing 
separation of powers structure because the proposals can 
be readily simplified and adapted to a parliamentary model 
which is inherently more conducive to procedures for 
policy coordination. In addition, large questions of 
substantive conditions necessary for and supportive of 
democratic planning have already been set aside on the 
basis that this is principally a procedural study. To 
set aside the major procedural difficulties of the separa­
tion of powers system by assuming a parliamentary system 
for the design of the proposals would simply limit too 
much the relevence of the proposals to the American 
context.
Under the general standards of majority rule,
Ranney and Kendall specify a condition (listed as 4.c.) 
involving majority and minority forbearance from actions 
destructive of the political community and a condition (4.d.)
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specifying a "community welfare" motive on the part of 
the citizenry. These are requirements of the model for 
the character of social relationships in a democracy. 
Ranney and Kendall write that " . . .  the members of the 
community must feel at least that minimum of mutual need 
that makes for forbearance . . . "  and that " . . .  the 
character and relatedness of the citizens must be of 
such a nature as to guarantee cooperative and mutually 
instructive discussion."12 These types of substantive 
conditions for democracy will not be used for the design 
of planning procedures because of the limits on the 
scope of this paper. Although Ranney and Kendall describe 
these conditions, they do not suggest how they arise or 
what role public policy might play in creating or encourag­
ing these conditions. Thus, the further study of these 
matters would need to go beyond the conceptual framework 
provided by Ranney and Kendall.
After these comments, exceptions, and modifica­
tions, what remains of the model that is important to 
procedures for democratic planning? The Idea of majority 
rule exercised through a representative assembly is 
a central feature of the model. The assembly is to 
make the society's laws and control other public officials. 
The legislative body is to be linked to the public not 
only through elections, but also through mechanisms of 
consultation that allow the public to propose, discuss.
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and acquire knowledge and understanding about matters of 
public policy. Each person is to have an equal right to 
participate in public decision-making. Underlying these 
elements is the idea that the whole power of the state 
is to rest ultimately with the people, with the extent of 
the state being determined itself by democratic processes.
As applied to planning, the standard of majority 
rule exercised through a representative assembly means 
that the planning process should be based in the legisla­
tive branch. The legislature would be responsible for 
adopting and supervising the implementation of the key 
policies of the process in a manner that satisfies the 
characteristics of planning developed in the previous 
chapter. Because the legislature is to control other 
public officials, the responsibility for intervening 
on behalf of the public in any key step of the process 
of planning would rest with the legislature.
The principal mechanism of consultation that 
will be proposed for linking the public to planning 
decisions made in the legislature will be political 
parties. The subject matter of planning involves the 
consideration of topics that cut across the boundaries 
of different spheres of public policy and the concerns 
of particular interest groups. Parties offer an arena 
in which citizens can consider, propose, and organize 
on behalf of general policies that might be used to
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coordinate activities in different policy areas. In 
addition, arrangements can be made to incorporate 
expert knowledge into party discussions in an under­
standable manner that enables citizens to use it in 
combination with other knowledge appropriate to the 
development of policies for planning. The standard of 
political equality would apply to the activities of 
parties, and their compatibility with that standard is 
considered further in the next chapter.
The range and scope of the planning process—  
and implicitly the determination of the extent of the 
institutions to be considered as a part of the state—  
would itself be a matter of public policy. To make 
planning subject to democratic procedures is to make it 
an integral part of political processes and subject to 
political judgments.
This chapter has presented and discussed one 
version of democracy. Its general implications for the 
conduct of planning in a democratic manner have been 
introduced. The next chapter explores these implications 
in greater detail.
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CHAPTER IV 
PROCEDURES FOR DEMOCRATIC PLANNING
The purpose of this chapter is to propose a 
strategy for the conduct of planning that is consistent 
with both the standards of effective planning and the 
standards of democracy that have been previously developed. 
As has already been presented the Institutions that are 
proposed to perform key planning functions are the Congress 
and political parties. The justification for centering 
the process around these institutions will be given 
further consideration before considering the elements of 
of the proposed strategy for democratic planning.
The overall role of Congress would be to establish 
the planning framework and within that framework to adopt 
both general and broad functional policies for planning, 
to oversee the implementation of those policies, and to 
intervene in executive planning processes when it appeared 
that those processes were not conforming to the policies 
adopted by law. Congress possesses the legal authority 
necessary for these tasks, although it may not have 
exercised that authority in the manner proposed. Moreover, 
the standards of democracy assumed in this paper clearly
73
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require that public policy be established by the legislative 
instead of the executive branch.
An executive-based system also does not allow 
for the open discussion and consideration of alternative 
proposals inherent in the legislative process. An example 
of the absence of open discussion In executive policy 
formation is provided each year by the relative secrecy 
surrounding the development of the Presidential budget 
and" was vividly illustrated in July, 1979» by the 
seclusion of President Carter in Camp David, Maryland, 
for a comprehensive energy, economic, and political 
policy review. Certainly, members of Congress also 
meet privately, but the decisions of the entire Congress 
are generally made in open proceedings with open debate 
and the benefit of prior public hearings. The decisions 
of Presidents are generally made through private consulta­
tions supported by the practice of executive privilege.
Political parties would be developed as major 
institutions for citizen participation in planning. As 
such, the standard of political equality— that each 
citizen has the same formal right to participate in 
decision-making--is especially relevant in judging the 
appropriateness of parties for this role. The structure 
of parties is regulated as a matter of law, and they are 
generally required to be open to those who wish to 
participate. In this respect, parties contrast with
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interest groups that often have explicit restrictions 
on membership.
The desire to win elections also provides parties 
with a practical incentive to be effectively open to the 
participation of those who wish to be members. That at 
times there are other factors that result in parties 
failing to be as effectively open as they could or should 
be will not be denied, but as a general rule parties have 
been a force for political equalization by mobilizing the 
power of individual citizens. As Walter Dean Burnham has 
argued,
political parties, with all their well-known 
human structural shortcomings, are the only 
devices thus far invented by the wit of Western 
man that can, with some effectiveness, generate 
countervailing collective power on behalf of the 
many individually powerless against the relatively 
few who are individually or organizationally 
powerful.1
Parties are not perfect, but they are legally open to 
participation and have practical incentives to be so 
in fact. Public policies can also be adopted to 
strengthen parties as vehicles for citizen participation, 
and some suggestions in this paper would likely to have 
that effect.
Parties also engage, when preparing platforms, 
in precisely the kind of discussions that are involved in 
developing proposals for the general policies of planning. 
The general policies of planning are based on a comparison 
of policies and activities in specific areas and the
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development of terms on which they can be adjusted to 
each other. Parties in adopting platforms compare the 
claims of different groups (i.e. the policies and activities 
in different policy areas) and state the policy terms on 
which the interests under consideration might be aggre­
gated or adjusted to each other. The idea of party plat­
forms as proposals for national plans was proposed by 
Paul T. David on the basis of his studies of the increas­
ingly detailed nature of party platforms adopted between 
19^4 and 1968 and the relatively high rate with which 
platform pledges were fulfilled (72 percent rate of ful­
fillment).2 This evidence suggests that platforms can 
be both comprehensive policy documents and reasonably 
effective guides to action.
The same view of parties as capable of undertaking
public discussions that lead to general policy proposals
to integrate the activities of government was advanced by
a special committee of the American Political Science
Association in 1950:
One of the most pressing requirements of contem­
porary politics is for the party in power to furnish 
a general kind of direction over the government as a 
whole. The crux of public affairs lies in the neces­
sity for more effective formulation of general poli­
cies and programs and for better integration of all 
of the far-flung activities of modern government.
Only large-scale and representative political 
organizations possess the qualifications needed for 
these tasks . . . . It is in terms of party programs 
that political leaders can attempt to consolidate 
public attitudes toward the work plans of government.3
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More recently, in an analysis of how reform movements 
have weakened political parties, Everett Carll Ladd has 
argued the well-understood point that parties in the past 
provided a means for overcoming conflicts between the 
executive and legislative branches by being a common bond 
for office holders in both branches and that "By removing 
party from governance, we have aided the already strong 
centrifugal forces working against coherence in public 
p o l i c y . I t  is because parties are capable, if they 
are allowed to by the institutional framework of govern­
ment, of being open mechanisms for encouraging the integra­
tion of public policy that their strengthening is proposed.
A strategy for democratic planning is proposed 
below. The elements of this strategy are based on 
judgments concerning how to reconcile the standards for 
effective planning with the standards for procedural 
democracy. The strategy is divided into elements that 
apply to Congress, to the executive branch, and to 
political parties. The elements of the strategy are 
stated in teimaa of guidelines, and they can be implemented 
in different ways. Examples of measures that could be 
used for implementation are given after the discussion 
of the strategy.
Congress should establish the planning process as 
a matter of law. Within that process. Congress should 
adopt general policies and oversee their implementation
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through both specific legislation and executive programs. 
The process should be continuous and interactive; general 
policies should be updated in response to changing 
circumstances and to the experience of viewing those 
policies in relation to specific decisions. In all of 
its major legislation, Congress should state its policies 
as clearly and definitely as possible. Consistent with 
the recommendations for strengthening the linkage of 
parties, the role of both party caucuses and party 
leadership should be strengthened within Congress.
Planning should be required of executive agencies 
that is consistent with policies established in law. The 
role of the President as a **faithful executor of the law" 
should be strengthened by requiring his certification of 
agency compliance with the policies stated in law. Pro­
visions should exist for Congress to intervene if it judged 
agency action to be out of compliance with policies it had 
enacted.
Parties should be linked to the planning process 
in several ways. They should have the ability to develop 
and analyze policy independent of the government, provided 
that they meet standards of opennesss and minimum levels 
of membership. Arrangements should exist whereby the 
membership can have access to expert knowledge pertaining 
to the issues of concern to them. Parties should have 
a formal role in advising on public policy and monitoring
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its implementation. The role of parties in the election 
of officials and the appointment of policy-level administra­
tors should be generally strengthened.
A variety of steps could be taken to implement 
this strategy, and one set of such steps is presented 
here. These measures are presented for debate and further 
consideration and to aid in understanding the implications 
of the proposed strategy. It should be understood, 
however, that it is the strategy that is being proposed 
and that the specific steps are possible ways that it 
could be implemented.
The general policies of a planning process could 
be embodied in a five-year, annually updated plan enacted 
by Congress, The plan could be prepared with recommendations 
from the parties required in advsuice. The actual presenta­
tion of a proposed nlan could be the responsibility of 
the majority party leadership in each house, with the 
consultation of the party caucus.
The role of this plan would be that of a guide 
for both the work of Congress and of the executive branch. 
With its first budget resolution, Congress oould also 
report a program resolution intended to implement the 
plan and instructing congressional committees on the 
schedule and nature of major legislation to be reviewed 
or developed. All legislation, including appropriations, 
would include clear policy direction to executive agencies
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concerning both the goals and means of the programs 
that they administer.
Each executive program oould be required to have 
an annual plan, prepared with public input organized 
in conjunction with the political parties. The President 
could be required to transmit to Congress a certification 
that the agency plan was consistent with the policies 
enacted in law. Implementation of the annual plan could 
be delayed by Congress if it felt the plan did not follow 
legislative guidelines, and the plan could be amended by 
law during such a delay.
Parties could not only make proposals to Congress 
on the general plan and major legislation, but could also 
monitor legislative and executive processes through panels 
that would sit simultaneously with any committee or 
official conducting programmatic or policy hearings.
Such panels could perform a variety of discussion and 
communication purposes within the political and planning 
processes. Among other functions, the panels could 
alert Congress to executive programs being developed 
that were perhaps not consistent with the general plan.
Parties meeting minimal membership requirements 
in the nation could be provided with public funds for 
their planning-related activities and could have the 
official right to participate in planning processes as 
indicated. The funds could be used not only to finance
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the expenses of party members in planning-related work, 
but also to employ expert staff. So that expert policy 
staff could be available to work at the direction of 
parties at all levels, sufficient funding could be 
provided for staff down to the county level of party 
organizations. Setting expert against expert in the 
competitive party process is one method of subordinating 
experts to the public in the planning process.
The role of parties in the election of officials 
could be strengthened by eliminating tax deductions for 
campaign purposes for organizations other than parties. 
Similarly, public campaign funds could be limited to 
party organizations. With respect to administrative 
policy officials, their appointments could require, in 
addition to other qualifications, an openly-adopted 
favorable recommendation from the party of the appointing 
official.
The above steps, again, are intended only as 
examples of how the overall strategy for democratic 
planning procedures could be implemented. More important 
is the strategy itself. It emphasizes the need for 
general policies to guide and integrate the work of 
government. Those policies would be implemented through 
an interactive process that allows for public intervention 
and control at key stages. Provision would be made 
for the interchange of knowledge among experts, citizens,
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and political leaders. The process would he focused on 
decisions made by Congress with participation by political 
parties. Parties would provide for open discussion and 
consultation on planning policies and would be the 
vehicle for mobilizing majority opinion on behalf of 
the policies.
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CONCLUSION
Planning in the United States is done in only 
a partial way, because planning is fragmented into 
separate functional, program, or project pieces. The 
alliances of groups and public authorities that now 
control the separate and partial pieces of planning 
each constitute a minority that can, in the normal course 
of events, veto policies or the application of policies in 
their areas of concern. The qualification of "the normal 
course of events" is important, because the veto power 
of each alliance is not absolute. The veto power of 
an alliance may be overcome at times when it engages in 
a direct clash of interests with another alliance of 
superior power.
The veto power of all the alliances is normally 
not threatened on an across the board basis in the United 
States, except in times of crisis— of depression, of war, 
and of occasional public unrest over the general course 
of events. It is at such times that a general policy 
agenda— an agenda of fundamental issues— emerges, and 
basic decisions are made that alter the rules and 
assumptions by which the alliances may again resume
8 4
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control of policy in separate areas in the normal course 
of events.
Politics as normally conducted in the United 
States does not fully conform to the standards of majority 
rule in the Ranney and Kendall model. The determination 
of policy in normal times is parceled out among the 
minority alliances and is not subject to majority control. 
Nor is there evidence that in the era of the positive 
state, when public policy has a substantial impact on 
nearly every aspect of society, that the method of sepa­
rate interventions presided over by separate clusters of 
power works well. The practice of treating separately 
things that are inseparable appears to be creating 
stresses that may produce the next crisis in American 
society.
The stresses result from the failure of a broad 
range of public efforts to produced desired results in 
dealing with social, economic, and environmental circum­
stances that would seem to require public intervention. 
Efforts have been undertaken to maintain the stability 
of the economic order through economic growth, price 
stability, and full employment; to cope with the pressures 
created by the economy on the environment and resource 
supplies ; and to alleviate the adverse human effects of 
the inequalities inherent in the prevailing system of 
economic incentives. Although launched in response to
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sexternal effects produced by a private market system, the 
separate and selective public interventions have produced 
their own external effects. These effects are as 
systematically ignored by the public authorities that 
create them as market externalities are ignored by private 
economic authorities. Policies pursued in separate 
areas either contradict each other or cumulatively produce 
unexpected negative consequences. New grounds must be 
found for reconciling policy in different areas. How 
to discover those grounds of reconciliation has been the 
concern of this paper.
As noted the American political system, at least 
since the advent of the positive state in response to 
corporate capitalism, has usually attempted to reconcile 
policy in different areas during times of crisis. The 
pattern of response has typically been the rallying of 
public support for a President or President-to-be. The 
President, in turn, has attempted to marshal the support 
to unclog the governmental machinery and secure adoption 
and implementation of measures to deal with the crisis at 
hand. This has been the American crisis style of planning.
This style of planning meets the criteria of 
democracy suggested in this paper in only a minimal way. 
Majority sentiment is mobilized around a leader and, perhaps, 
a broad set of policy ideas for a certain period of time.
But it is difficult to see how this crisis style of
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planning allows for popular consultation and participation 
in the continuing development of policy measures. The 
gap between what Presidents secure a mandate for as 
candidates and what they have actually done (some of which 
is expected because of changing circumstances and knowledge) 
is too great to suggest that participating in the election 
of a President is an adequate and effective way for the 
public to participate in shaping public policy. The
making of policy through Presidential plebiscite also
eclipses the legislative branch that is to make the laws, 
control officials, and conduct the open debate that is to 
inform and interact with a larger public debate of the 
issues at hand. The American crisis style of planning 
cannot meet standards of democracy that go beyond the
election of officials by a majority.
The rallying of support behind a President and 
program in times of crisis has tended to accentuate the 
control of policy by minority alliances in normal times.
It was Wilson*s New Freedom that helped usher in the 
Federal Reserve System, intended as a reform to break the 
power of central banks, but which now seems to insulate 
monetary policy and the distribution of capital so 
effectively from majority control. Roosevelt’s New Deal 
helped to create many of the separate programs around 
which power is now clustered and set, in Lowi’s interpreta­
tion, the basic course toward the triunqph of interest
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group liberalism in the 1960*s. The reformers in these 
and other oases may not have intended these results for 
the character of the political system, and the results 
may have been partially shaped by the con^romises that 
had to be made with opponents of reform. Nonetheless, 
the overall pattern has been the acquisition of power by 
Presidents in times of crisis leading to the exercise of 
that power in normal times by minority alliances.
The crisis style of planning is not only bad 
democracy; it is also bad planning. General planning is 
conducted only on an episodic basis after problems have 
become severe enough to jolt government into action. A 
continuing and direct consideration of general policy and 
its relationship to activities in different areas is not 
undertaken. At other times, interrelated decisions—  
decisions with general consequences— are made on a separate 
basis and produce the external effects to which reference 
has already been made. Remedying the planning deficiencies 
of the crisis style solely within the executive branch 
would lead society further away from instead of toward 
democratic planning. Effective executive-controlled 
planning would involve, even more so than at present, 
the domination of the making and implementation of policy 
by the President, administrative officials, and experts 
working alliances with and on behalf of the interests of 
their sources of power within the organized segments of
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society. This approach to planning leads to a world 
In which persons become roses planted on the planner's 
wall and where all can get by reasonably well provided 
that their prejudices are not uncooperative.
Instead of attempting to Improve planning as 
an executive-led process, this paper has proposed the 
development of planning centered In the legislative 
branch and the political parties, Congress has sufficient 
potential authority to preside over a planning process If 
it chooses to exercise that authority through the making 
of policy in law. To exercise that authority for planning 
would require that Congress be capable of the kind of 
coherent action In formulating policy that It seems to 
display so rarely. Strengthening the political parties 
both Inside and outside Congress would Increase the ability 
of Congress to undertake coherent action. Strengthened 
parties also create the mechanism for popular consulta­
tion and democratic participation In the making of public 
policy.
Harlan Cleveland, In an article entitled "How Do 
You Get Everybody In on the Act and Still Get Some Action?" 
has stated the argument that there Is a necessary contra­
diction between Increased participation and the need for 
action in particular cases.1 But all of the examples 
given by Cleveland to make this case are exançles of 
executive decision-making. An opposite result can occur
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In the case of political parties. The more people that 
are involved in a party, the more likely it is that the 
party will be able to organize a majority to secure the 
political power necessary to carry out a program of action.
There is no greater testimony on behalf of the 
case that parties can organize democratic participation 
for action than the history of political reform movements 
in the United States, Every purely political, as opposed 
to economic and social, reform movement in this nation's 
history— the adoption of the Constitution, the Pendleton 
Act, the open primary laws and non-partisan municipal 
government trend of the Progressive Era, and the ostensibly 
"participatory* internal party reform effort of the late 
1960*3— have been movements led by middle class and/or 
upper class elements of society. Each of these movements 
of reform had the effect of weakening the potential or 
existing structure of political parties as vehicles through 
which lower social and economic classes could organize and 
exercise political power. What should be surprising 
about parties in America is not that they are so weak, 
but that in the face of conscious public policy efforts 
to prevent or weaken parties they exist at all.
Organizing planning as a partisan and legislative 
activity will redefine the conventional notion of what 
planning is. Instead of being a comprehensive effort by 
expert planners to organize date, rank goals in priority.
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and generate blueprint recommendations, planning will 
be guided more explicitly by judgments of value and 
judgments of insight into the character of relationships 
in society. Expertise will not be discarded in the 
effort, but will be guided by judgments that are the 
province of citizens organized in the political process. 
This redefinition of planning to focus on the development 
of general policies through the political process will 
not only help to make planning democratic, but also 
effective.
The recommendations of this paper would only make 
democratic planning more nearly a possibility. To make it 
a reality would require that citizens participate effec­
tively in the political process that has been outlined. 
Investigating questions of whether the public could and 
would participate effectively in such a process is the 
next step in the study of democratic planning as begun 
in this paper. Would citizens actually choose to parti­
cipate in the type of process proposed? Could they 
participate with an effective understanding of the complex, 
collective issues involved in such a process? Would 
decentralized political participation organized through 
parties in fact be effective in overcoming concentra­
tions of economic and social power that distort the 
outcomes of the political process? If answers to any 
of these questions are negative, what in addition to or
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In place of what has been proposed here would be necessary 
to achieve democratic planning? These are among the 
questions that should form the continuing agenda of study 
and debate concerning democratic planning.
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